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HE most significant cases in the area of Civil Evidence during the
Survey period involved issues of privileges and expert testimony.
The major development in expert testimony was the amendment
to the Federal Rules of Evidence. In order to be timely, the authors in-
cluded the discussion of those changes in last year's Survey, so they are
only briefly discussed in this article.1 Other than these changes to the
federal rules, federal courts were rather quiet on the issue of expert testi-
mony. In the one case of note, Judge Jack of the Southern District of
Texas provided a thoughtful and well-reasoned example of when it is
proper to apply the Daubert factors to determine reliability. State courts
provided some guidance on the issue of expert testimony during this Sur-
vey period, but they also provided some examples of very poor reasoning
that resulted in substantial injustice. A few state judges sometimes fail to
remember that Rule 702 and the court's gatekeeping function under
Robinson require a flexible analysis tied to the facts of the case and that
cross-examination remains the best way to test shaky expert testimony.
Privileges is another area of evidence in which there are significant de-
cisions this Survey period. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a
defendant in a personal injury case may hire the plaintiff's doctor to tes-
tify against the plaintiff, despite such arrangements being contrary to the
policies behind Rule 509.2 The Texas Supreme Court supplied guidance
on the analysis of medical peer review privilege, 3 and Judge Buchmeyer
of the Northern District of Texas recognized a father-son privilege in
Texas, but only if the son is a CPA.4 Finally, the Beaumont Court of
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SMU LAW REVIEW
Appeals held that an assignment of a Stowers claim does not automati-
cally waive the attorney-client privilege. 5
There are two cases of interest in other areas of evidence. In the first
of these cases, the First District Court of Appeals in Houston explains
that a document clearly created for the litigation in response to an attor-
ney's request cannot fall under the Business Records exception to the
hearsay rule. 6 In the second, the Tyler Court of Appeals, in an opinion in
which the court was obviously looking for any possible way to overrule
the appellant's point of error, reveals the panel's outcome-oriented ap-
proach to jurisprudence. 7
This article cannot encompass every development in Civil Evidence,
nor can it include every interesting case. The authors hope, however, that
it provides some guidance as to the significant developments and trends
in this area of the law-with particular regard to the rules governing ex-
pert testimony and privileges.
II. EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. FEDERAL CASES
Beginning with a brief summary of the changes to the Federal Rules of
Evidence related to expert testimony, Rule 701 now states that if a wit-
ness is not testifying as an expert, his opinion cannot be "based on scien-
tific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule
702."'8 The Advisory Committee Note explains that the change was made
"to eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule
702 will be evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an expert
in lay witness clothing."9 Rule 702 was also amended. It now states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact issue, a
witness qualified to testify as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.10
5. In re Cooper, 47 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, orig. proceeding).
6. Freeman v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 53 S.W.3d 710 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2001, no pet. h.).
7. Lively v. Blackwell, 51 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001, pet. denied).
8. The former version of Rule 701 stated:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form
of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a
clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact
in issue.
FED. R. EviD. 701 (amended Dec. 1, 2000).
9. FED. R. EvID. 701 advisory committee notes.
10. The former version of Rule 702 stated:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact issue, a witness quali-
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The Advisory Committee Notes state that "this amendment is not in-
tended to provide an excuse for an automatic challenge to the testimony
of every expert."'" The committee also explained that it was not attempt-
ing to set forth procedural requirements for Daubert proceedings and em-
phasized that trial courts have broad discretion in fashioning their own
proceedings. 12
There were few federal cases of note during the Survey period, and
there are no reported cases in which a federal court identified any signifi-
cant changes in the analysis of the admissibility of expert testimony due
to the changes in Rule 702. This reinforces the view that the changes
were merely a codification of the Daubert/Kumho Tire relevance and reli-
ability analysis.
The only federal case on expert testimony discussed in this year's Sur-
vey is Brumley v. Pfizer, Inc.13 In Brumley, the plaintiffs, who were the
wrongful death beneficiaries of Earnest Brumley, sued Pfizer after Brum-
ley died of heart complications two hours after taking Viagra and having
sex. In order to prove causation, the plaintiffs sought to introduce the
testimony of Dr. Gerald Polukoff who proposed to testify that Viagra
causes "a marked increase in sympathetic activation," which is "associ-
ated with myocardial ischemia, myocardial infarction, malignant and fatal
arrhythmias and sudden death. ' 14 Therefore, in Polukoff's opinion, "Mr.
Brumley would have survived sex were it not for his ingestion of Viagra
on the night of his death.' 15
Pfizer challenged Polukoff's opinion as unreliable under Daubert. At
his deposition, Polukoff testified that he relied on a report published by
Brady Phillips in the journal Circulation that demonstrated that Viagra
caused catecholamine levels to rise. Catechlomines, according to
Polukoff, are "clearly known to alter cardiovascular outcome . . . ad-
versely."'1 6 But the rise in catecholamine levels indicated in the study
fied to testify as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. EvID. 702 (amended Dec. 1, 2000).
11. FED. R. EvID. 702 (2000 Committee Notes) (citing Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999) (noting that the trial court has discretion "both to avoid unneces-
sary 'reliability' proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability of an expert's methods
is properly taken for granted, and to require appropriate proceedings in the less usual and
more complex cases where causes for questioning the expert's reliability arises")).
12. See id.; see also Kuhmo Tire, 526 U.S. at 152 ("That [abuse of discretion standard]
applies as much to the trial court's decisions about how to determine reliability as to its
ultimate conclusion."); Michael W. Shore, Civil Evidence, 53 SMU L. REV. 699, 701-03
(2000) ("As long as the trial court uses a method that is not arbitrary or capricious in
reviewing the expert testimony for relevancy and reliability, the trial court's decision on
admissibility should stand on appeal."); Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L.
REV. 699, 766 (1998) ("Trial courts should be allowed substantial discretion in dealing with
Daubert questions; any attempt to codify procedures will likely give rise to unnecessary
changes in practice and create difficult question for appellate review.").
13. 200 F.R.D. 596 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
14. Id. at 598.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 599.
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were no higher than that experienced by anyone engaged in physical ac-
tivity and there were no studies to which Polukoff could point that dis-
cussed what level of catecholamines is normal or abnormal. The study
concluded by saying that "it is reasonable to assume, first, that increased
sympathetic drive may contribute to the initiation of cardiovascular
events, and second, that cardiovascular events, particularly arrhythmias
and myocardial infarction, that occur in the setting of a high level of sym-
pathetic activation are likely to have poorer outcomes.' 7 But the report
did not conclude that the increase catecholamine levels caused by taking
Viagra actually have a detrimental effect on diseased cardiovascular sys-
tems. It merely suggested that this is an important area for future study.
In its opinion, the court first noted that while Daubert's four-part test
"is not the only means to examine expert testimony,"'18 it was appropriate
to use in evaluating Polukoff's opinions. Polukoff's opinion, however, did
not make it past even the first Daubert factor-"whether the theory or
technique in question can be and has been tested." 19 The testability fac-
tor is really in two parts: (1) can the theory be tested, and (2) has it actu-
ally been tested. As to the first part, testability, this "is a threshold
requirement aimed at excluding pseudoscience from the courtroom. °20 If
a theory is not testable, it is not falsifiable "and of no practical use in the
courtroom. '21 The court concluded that Polukoff's theory was testable,
but the analysis of this Daubert factor could not end simply because it was
determined that the theory was testable. "[T]o stop the analysis at
testability would allow in any theory, even one universally recognized as
wrong, merely because it is testable.122
While Polukoff's theory was testable, no one had actually tested it. The
plaintiffs, therefore, argued that Polukoff's theory was a valid extrapola-
tion of the data in the Phillips' report. The court, however, noted that
while the Phillips report demonstrated that Viagra raised the levels of
catecholamines, there was no evidence that the increased level of cat-
echolamines were unsafe. Extrapolation was, therefore, not possible
without some other evidence to fill this "analytical gap."'2 3 The court ex-
plained that a study cannot be used "to support a conclusion that the
study itself does not make,"2 4 and the "strong temporal relationship be-
tween Mr. Brumley's first use of Viagra and his sudden death, without
more, does not make Dr. Polukoff's opinion any more reliable. '25 The
17. Id. at 599.
18. Brumley, 200 F.R.D. at 601.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 602.
21. Id. (citing KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE, SCIEN-
TIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS ch. 3 (MIT Press 1997)).
22. Id.
23. Brumley, 200 F.R.D. at 602 (citing Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269,
277 (5th Cir. 1998)).
24. Id. (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) and Moore, 151 F.3d at
278-79).
25. Id. (citing Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661, 670 (5th Cir. 1999)).
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court, therefore, concluded that Polukoff's opinion "simply is not sup-
ported by any real world observations or experimental scrutiny" and was,
therefore, not admissible. 26
While the ultimate decision to exclude Polukoff's testimony was cor-
rect, Judge Jack's analysis was wrong in one important aspect. It is possi-
ble to extrapolate the findings from a study to support an expert's
opinion,27 but there must be some other evidence to fill any "analytical
gaps" between the two. In Brumley, that other evidence was missing.
Polukoff could not state that Viagra raised the level of catecholam to a
level that was abnormal. Proponents of expert testimony must be pre-
pared to present to the court a logically sound basis for the expert's opin-
ions, filling in all analytical gaps. And in cases where scientific testimony
is needed for causation, and the Daubert factors are thus well-suited for
analyzing the testimony, the proponent of the expert testimony should
have peer-reviewed studies supporting each step of the analysis.
B. TEXAS CASES
Federal Rule 702 is now slightly different from Texas Rule of Evidence
702, but the analysis under the rules remains similar. Texas Rule of Evi-
dence 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise." Two years after the United States Supreme Court decided
Daubert, the Texas Supreme Court in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Robinson28 adopted Daubert's reliability and relevancy requirements for
determining the admissibility of scientific expert testimony under Texas
Rule of Evidence 702. In Robinson, the Texas Supreme Court listed six
factors that trial courts should consider when determining the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony:
(1) The extent to which the theory has been or can be tested;
(2) The extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective inter-
pretation of the expert;
(3) Whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or
publication;
(4) The technique's potential rate of error;
(5) Whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally ac-
cepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and
(6) The non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or
technique.29
26. Id.
27. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) ("Trained experts commonly
extrapolate from existing data.").
28. 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
29. Id. at 557.
2002]
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The court noted that a particular case may require a trial court to con-
sider other factors to determine scientific reliability. 30 Thus, Robinson's
factors are not exclusive.
In Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc.,31 the Texas Supreme Court
held that "Rule 702's fundamental requirements of reliability and rele-
vance are applicable to all expert testimony offered under that rule"-not
just scientific expert testimony.32 The difference between scientific and
non-scientific evidence is that the former is based upon scientific princi-
ples that can be readily tested under the Robinson factors, while the latter
is based upon technical or other specialized knowledge acquired through
experience or observation. 33
Under Gammill, when a party seeks to introduce non-scientific expert
testimony, the test for admissibility is whether "there is simply too great
an analytical gap between the data and the opinion offered. '34 In apply-
ing this test, Texas courts have conducted detailed analysis of the basis for
the expert's opinions and how the expert's conclusions reasonably relate
to the facts of the case.
A. EXPERT TESTIMONY GENERALLY
Politically-minded trial and appellate courts in Texas are often creative
in the ways in which they deny injured Texans their rights through the
exclusion of expert testimony. An example of this sad fact is found in
Pack v. Crossroads, Inc.,35 in which the Fort Worth Court of Appeals up-
held the trial court's exclusion of facts from a Texas Department of
Human Services (TDHS) investigation on the grounds that these facts
somehow constituted expert opinion testimony by a lay witness.
36
Six months after undergoing hip surgery, James Watson was admitted
to Watson Memorial Nursing Home. The opinion does not describe Wat-
son's condition when he entered the nursing home other than saying that
he had "health problems."' 37 It does, however, describe his condition
thirty-seven days later when Watson was transferred to Harris Methodist
Hospital: "There, doctors noted Watson's physical condition: tongue
coated with a thick membrane; dry mucous membranes; fecal matter on
perineum and legs; cloudy urine; gangrene on the right foot; and decubiti
on the heels of his feet and his right hip."'38 Watson died a week after he
30. Id.
31. 972 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. 1998).
32. Id. at 726.
33. See id. at 727; see also State Farm Lloyds v. Mireles, 63 S.W.3d 491, 497-98 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet. h.) (holding the Robinson factors inapplicable to a foun-
dation engineer's testimony); Ford Motor Co. v. Aguiniga, 9 S.W.3d 252, 263 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (holding the Robinson factors inapplicable to mechanical
engineer's testimony).
34. Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 727.
35. 53 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied).
36. See id. at 500.




was admitted to the hospital.
The plaintiffs in the wrongful death and survival action that followed
sought to introduce TDHS records from investigations of Watson Memo-
rial from 1992 to 1995. In describing these records, the court simply
stated that they "reflected certain conditions of care of several residents
prior to and contemporaneous with Watson's residency at Watson Memo-
rial." 39 The documents contained examples of patients who suffered con-
ditions similar to Watson's. Plaintiffs argued therefore, that Watson
Memorial was aware that conditions in the nursing home could lead to
injuries like those suffered by Watson. Watson Memorial objected to the
documents as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial under Rules 401 and 403.
The trial court sustained the objection, and the plaintiffs were not al-
lowed to present the evidence at trial.
On appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals in an opinion by Justice
Sam Day, upheld the trial court's ruling. The appellate court's reasoning
is dubious at best. The court correctly noted that expert testimony is gen-
erally required in a medical malpractice case to prove the standard of
care, breach of that standard, and causation.40 The court then noted that
"[l]ay witness testimony about negligence and proximate cause has no
probative force in a medical malpractice case" 4 1 and then held that since
the TDHS reports did not constitute expert testimony, they could not be
used "to prove that Watson Memorial could foresee that its omission
would injure Watson."'42 There is no indication in the court's opinion that
the reports contained any lay opinions as to negligence and proximate
cause, but merely descriptions of the conditions in the nursing home and
injuries to other patients. These are facts that the TDHS is required by
law to report, and licensing authorities rely on these factual investigations
in deciding whether nursing homes will be allowed to continue operating.
These admissible facts can and should be introduced into evidence along
with appropriate expert opinion testimony regarding their significance. 43
The court also held that due to the "slight probative nature of these
documents, their admission would have been overly prejudicial" and ex-
clusion was appropriate under Rule 403.44 How could the fact that other
patients in the same nursing home suffered similar injuries have only a
"slight probative nature"? Furthermore, what is "overly prejudicial"?
Any advocate who introduces evidence in support of his or her client's
39. Id. at 499-500.
40. Id. at 500 (citing Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165-66 (Tex. 1977); White v.
Wah, 789 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ); Shook v. Her-
man, 759 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1988, writ denied)).
41. Id. (citing Flores v. Ctr. For Spinal Evaluation & Rehab., 865 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ); Tilotta v. Goodall, 752 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied)).
42. Id.
43. The defendant did not make a hearsay objection to the TDHS reports, and the
court did not discuss the hearsay. These records would presumably fall under the public
records and reports exception to the hearsay rule found in Texas Rule of Evidence 803(8).
44. Pack, 53 S.W.3d at 500.
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case hopes that the evidence is "overly prejudicial." The test under Rule
403 is whether the prejudice is "unfair. ' 45 Unfair prejudice means that it
tends to persuade the jury to decide the case on an emotional or irra-
tional basis. 46 When a court excludes evidence on Rule 403 grounds, it
should articulate the danger the court sees of the jury misusing the evi-
dence. Courts should not simply note that the evidence is extremely prej-
udicial and exclude it without explaining why the prejudice is "unfair."
Rule 403 is not an "exclude the best evidence" rule.
B. EXPERT QUALIFICATIONS
The party offering expert testimony is required to establish that the
expert has knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding
the specific issue before the court. 47 The appellate courts will not disturb
the trial court's determination of whether an expert is qualified to testify
unless the trial court abuses its discretion. 48 Several cases during the Sur-
vey period discussed expert qualifications and reaffirmed that this too is a
flexible analysis focusing on the "fit" between the subject matter about
which the expert proposes to testify and the expert's special knowledge,
training, or experience in that specific subject matter - not necessarily
the expert's occupation, title, or level of education. 49
In Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Anderson,50 the Fourteenth Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiffs' expert was qualified to testify about the
alleged escalator design defect, a safer alternative design, and causation
despite not having an engineering degree or having ever designed or
maintained an escalator. 51 Anderson involved an unusually gruesome in-
jury to a four-year-old boy, Scooter Anderson. Scooter was with his fa-
ther at his father's downtown Houston office. As they were riding down
the elevator together, Scooter's foot got caught between a widening gap
between the escalator step and the side skirt. As the elevator continued
45. See COCHRAN, TEXAS RULE OF EVIDENCE HANDBOOK (4th ed. 2001), at 215-16;
Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that "unfair
prejudice" does not mean evidence that is merely detrimental to the opposing side's case).
46. See Cochran, supra; McDonald v. State, 829 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. App. - Texar-
kana 1992, no writ) (defining unfair prejudice as "an undue tendency to suggest decision on
an improper basis, commonly an emotional one.").
47. See Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. 1996).
48. United Blood Servs. v. Longoria, 938 S.W.2d 29, 30-31 (Tex. 1997).
49. Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 153; see also Spivey v. James,1 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1999, pet. denied) (concluding that the trial court had abused its discretion in
excluding an expert's testimony based upon the fact that he did not practice in the same
field as the defendant without considering the expert's other background, training, and
experience); Blan v. Ali, 7 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. . App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.)
(holding that a trial court abused its discretion when it excluded the affidavit of the plain-
tiff's neurology expert after the trial court concluded that the neurologist was not qualified
to testify as the standard of care for a cardiologist or an emergency room physician when,
in fact, the expert was offering an opinion as to the standard of care that would apply to
any physician treating a patient with the plaintiff's particular condition-regardless of the
physician's particular area of expertise).
50. No. 14-98-01286-CV, 2001 WL 931177 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 16,
2001, no pet.).
51. Id. at *5.
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downward, Scooter's shoe, the skin on his foot, and three toes were torn
off. The Andersons sued Schindler, which was under contract to maintain
the escalator. The jury found Schindler negligent, grossly negligent, and
strictly liable for the escalator's design and marketing defects and
awarded substantial damages.5 2
At trial the Andersons introduced the expert testimony of Carl White.
White is not an engineer, or for that matter, a college graduate. He, how-
ever, completed a one-year course on escalator construction, mainte-
nance, and mechanics in 1957, is a licensed master in escalator installation
and maintenance, and has forty years of experience working in the indus-
try - mostly as an installer and consultant. He is also a member of nu-
merous industry organizations and has presented seventeen speeches and
seven industry papers on escalator safety. Finally, he holds two patents
on a safety device called a "side-step safety plate."'53 White testified
about the escalator's design defects, proper escalator maintenance, risk
reduction, and causation.54
Schindler attacked White's testimony on three grounds: (1) he is not an
engineer; (2) he has never personally maintained an escalator or installed
or maintained his safety device; and (3) he is not trained in accident re-
construction or causation analysis. 55 The court held that White's exten-
sive experience in the industry, his license, and his knowledge on safety
issues qualified him to testify. 56 The court gave several reasons for re-
jecting Schindler's arguments. First, "a witness need not have to have a
college degree to qualify as an expert."'57 Second, an expert need not be a
designer to testify about safety.58 As in this case, safety issues are often
related to proper maintenance as well as design. 59 Third, even though
White had never maintained an escalator, it was sufficient that he had a
master license to do so. 60 Finally, there is no requirement that an expert
have any specific training in accident reconstruction to testify about
causation. 61
In another case, Keeton v. Carrasco,62 the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals reminded us that in medical malpractice cases, an expert need not
be in the same exact field or specialty as the defendant to be qualified to
testify. In Keeton, the plaintiff had a spinal cord stimulator implanted.
After the procedure, the plaintiff developed severe pain and inflamma-
52. Id. at *3.
53. Id. at *4.
54. Id.
55. Schindler Elevator, 2001 WL 931177 at *5.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also Glasscock v. Income Prop. Serv., 888 S.W.2d 176, 180 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ dism'd by agr.).
58. Anderson, 2001 WL 931177 at *5.
59. Id. In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that due to improper maintenance, the gap
on either side of the escalator step had been allowed to widen to 1/4 inch, at least double
the 1/16 to 1/8 inch that it was designed to have. Id. at *2.
60. Id. at *5.
61. Id.
62. 53 S.W.3d 13 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied)
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tion in his back and hand. The plaintiff was first misdiagnosed as having
an allergic reaction to the material in the stimulator. However, when the
wound on his back burst open, it was discovered that he had a staph in-
fection and that the pain in his hand was due to a migratory embolus
resulting from the implantation of the stimulator. As a result, the plain-
tiff sued the two orthopedic surgeons who had treated him and failed to
detect the infection.
In opposition to a no-evidence summary judgment motion, the plaintiff
submitted the affidavit of his expert, Dr. Greenspan. Dr. Greenspan is
not an orthopedic surgeon, but he focuses his practice on "physical
medicine, rehabilitation, and pain management. ''63 He stated in his affi-
davit that the field of physical medicine includes the treatment of back
pain and that he often works with orthopedic surgeons who implant spi-
nal cord simulators on matters of post-operative care. He further stated
that "[t]he duty to recognize and aggressively treat post-operative infec-
tions is not peculiar to any specialty, but is common to all physicians. 64
Despite this testimony, the trial court struck Dr. Greenspan's affidavit
based, in part, on the defendant's argument that he was not qualified to
testify as to the standard of care for an orthopedic surgeon. 65
The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in striking the affidavit. 66 The court, citing Broders v. Heise,67
reaffirmed that it is not the expert's particular field of medicine that is the
focus of the analysis-it is "the condition underlying the claim and the
standard of care the defendant doctor is required to exercise with regard
to that condition.' '68 In this case, the condition was a staph infection re-
sulting from the implantation of the stimulator. Dr. Greenspan had often
consulted with physicians who implant spinal cord simulators and had
been involved in their post-operative treatment. He was familiar with the
standard of care and that standard required close monitoring for post-
operative infection. Therefore, Dr. Greenspan was qualified to testify,
and the trial court abused its discretion in striking his affidavit.69
The final case discussing qualification of experts is Morton Interna-
63. Id. at 22.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 22-23.
66. Id. at 26.
67. 924 S.W.2d at 151-53 (holding that the party offering the expert's testimony must
show that the expert has expertise, training, education or knowledge "regarding the spe-
cific issue before the court which would qualify the expert to give an opinion on that partic-
ular subject").
68. Keeton, 53 S.W.3d at 25 (citing Blan, 7 S.W.3d at 746).
69. Id. at 26; see Roberts v. Williamson, 52 S.W.3d 343, 348 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2001, pet. granted) (rejecting the defendant physician's argument that a pediatrician was
not qualified to testify regarding a newborn infants neurological injuries because the pedia-
trician was not a board certified neurologist). But see Dukatt v. United States, No. EP-99-
CA-339-DB, 2000 WL 33348770 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2000) (excluding the testimony of a
doctor specializing pain management who proposed to testify as to the standard of care
provided by an orthopedic surgeon during surgery).
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tional v. Gillespie.70 Morton teaches that lawyers can avoid having their
experts stricken by limiting their testimony to their area of "scientific,
technical, or other area of specialized knowledge. '71 Morton was an ap-
peal from a judgment for damages based on severe facial injuries Jacque-
line Gillespie sustained when the airbag on her Dodge minivan deployed
and struck her face. At trial, the plaintiffs introduced the testimony of
Dr. David Renfroe, a mechanical engineer and professor of vehicular dy-
namics at the University of Arkansas. Before Dr. Renfroe testified, the
defendant's attorney took him on voir dire and demonstrated that Dr.
Renfroe had very little specialized knowledge related to airbags. Based
on the testimony elicited during that voir dire examination, the defendant
moved to strike Dr. Renfroe's testimony. The trial court refused, and the
appellate court affirmed that decision.
In its analysis of Dr. Refroe's qualifications and his testimony, the Tex-
arkana Court of Appeals noted that while Dr. Renfroe did not meet the
requirements under Rule 702 to testify about airbag technology, he
"never exceeded the scope of the testimony for which he was offered as
an expert. '7 2 Other experts in the case, both for the plaintiff and defen-
dant, had testified that the airbag at issue was designed to fully inflate
within 50 milliseconds. Dr. Renfroe's testimony, based on his specialized
skill and training in vehicular dynamics, was simply offered to prove that
it was impossible for Mrs. Gillespie to reach the "knock-out zone" within
that short time, and thus, the airbag must have had a delayed deploy-
ment, which caused Mrs. Gillespie's injuries. 73 The court, therefore, con-
cluded "that based on Dr. Renfroe's education and experience, he was
qualified to give expert opinion testimony to these aspects of airbag de-
ployment and delayed deployment as it affected Mrs. Gillespie's
movement. ' 74
C. RELEVANCE AND RELIABILITY
In Jarrell v. Park Cities Carpet & Upholstery Cleaning, Inc.,Y5 the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the trial court had abused its discretion in
excluding the plaintiff's causation experts. The plaintiff in Jarrell claimed
that she suffered airway and nervous system disorders after Park Cities
cleaned cigarette smoke out of the offices where she worked. Park Cities
had used two chemicals called Unsmoke Thermo 55 and Unsmoke 9-D-9.
Both products had safety sheets warning that early reoccupancy could
cause eye, throat, and respiratory irritation and that acute exposure could
cause headaches. 76
70. 39 S.W.3d 651 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied).
71. TEX. R. EvID. 702.
72. Morton, 39 S.W.3d at 655.
73. Id. at 656.
74. Id.
75. 53 S.W.3d 901 (Tex App.-Dallas 2001, pet. filed)
76. Id. at 902 n.3.
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To prove causation, the plaintiff proffered several epidemiological
studies dealing with the components of Thermo 55 and 9-D-9, as well as
the testimony of a toxicologist. Park Cities did not contest the validity of
the studies. Rather, Park Cities argued that "no epidemiological study is
admissible ... unless it specifically names Thermo 55 and 9-D-9, the two
registered trademarks of the solutions at issue."'77 The trial court agreed
and excluded the studies and the testimony of the toxicologist as
unreliable.
The Dallas Court of Appeals wisely reversed, stating: "A manufacturer
could make slight variations in chemical solutions, apply different trade
names, and then assert there was no study on the variant solution. Such
an application reduces the Robinson/Havner analysis to a matter of se-
mantics, not science." '7 8
There were also some unwise decisions during the Survey period. One
such opinion was the San Antonio Court of Appeals' opinion in Helm v.
Swan.7 9 In Helm, the court held that the plaintiffs' experts' opinions were
not reliable even though they were testifying to the rather common sense
notion that withholding the standard treatment for a patient's infection
for thirteen hours can cause the results of the infection to be more severe
that they otherwise would have been. This case demonstrates that law-
yers must know the difference between expert testimony based on clinical
experience and that based on scientific evidence and know how to get
both admitted. It also shows once again the injustice that can result when
courts cling to the Robinson factors to analyze expert testimony even
when use of those factors may not be appropriate.
A review of the facts of Helm shows the terrible injustice that the pa-
tient's family suffered at the hands of the court. On May 12, 1995, Dr.
Delbert Chumley performed an "endoscopic retrograde cholangiopan-
creatography ('ERCP') with sphincter of Oddi manometry and sphincter-
otomy" on Thomas Helm.80 Afterwards, Chumley admitted Helm to
Methodist Hospital of San Antonio for observation and prescribed oral
pain medication (Darvocet) and medication for nausea (Phenergan) to be
given as needed. Shortly after admission, Helm began showing signs that
something was wrong. At 2:30 p.m., Thomas ate two trays of food and
vomited. He also complained of pain. In response, the nurses adminis-
tered the Darvocet and Phenergan, but the symptoms continued. At 5:00
p.m., the nurses phoned Dr. Thomas Swan, who was on call for Chumley,
and informed him that Thomas was continuing to have pain and nausea
despite the medications.
Despite the fact that Helm was admitted to the hospital to be moni-
tored for signs of pancreatitis, a well-known potential complication of
ERCP, Swan simply prescribed an even stronger pain medicine,
77. Id. at 903.
78. Id.
79. 61 S.W.3d 493 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
80. Id. at 494.
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Demerol, without visiting the patient. The nurses administered the
Demerol at 5:00 p.m. and 8:45 p.m. At 9:27 p.m., Helm again complained
of abdominal pain and vomited, and continued to suffer pain and vomit-
ing over the next twelve hours. The nurses, however, did not notify the
doctors of his symptoms again until 8:00 a.m. By that time, Helm had
become severely hypovolemic and developed necrotizing pancreatitis.
And the necrotizing pancreatitis had progressed to such'a state that per-
manent damage to his body was assured.
When Dr. Swan learned of his patient's condition at 8 a.m., he ordered
laboratory tests and began IV fluid resuscitation. According to the medi-
cal literature cited in the case, fluid resuscitation in patients suffering
from pancreatitis is "an essential component of treatment" to correct "in-
tervascular volume loss. ' 81 It also helps prevent "hypotension and renal
insufficiency," protect the "microcirculation of the pancreas," and
counteract "shock and renal failure. 82 Yet Thomas Helm was denied
this standard treatment for thirteen hours. As a result, Thomas Helm
suffered "renal failure, adult respiratory distress syndrome, multiple in-
fections, many surgical interventions, amputation of the fingers on his
right hand, tracheotomy, splenectomy, partial pancreatectomy, enter-
ocutaneous fistulas, acute myocardial infarction secondary to thrombosis,
and multiple small bowel fistulas. ''83
In the subsequent lawsuit against Chumley, Swan, and the hospital, the
Helm family argued that the thirteen hour delay in instituting aggressive
fluid therapy substantially increased the severity of Thomas Helm's com-
plications. In support of their claim, they sought to introduce the opin-
ions of two medical experts, Dr. Chris Yiantsou and Dr. Myles Keroack,
who proposed to testify that the hospital staff's failure to notify Swan of
Thomas Helm's persistent pain fell below the standard of care and caused
the complications. In addition, Dr. Keroack criticized Swan for failing to
suspect the possibility of pancreatitis when the nurses first contacted him
at 5:00 p.m. and for failing to aggressively institute fluid resuscitation at
that time.
The defendants filed motions to exclude the testimony of both of these
experts as unreliable. They also filed motions for summary judgment
claiming that the Helms did not have any expert testimony to prove
breach of the standard of care or causation if Yiantsou's and Keroack's
testimony were stricken. The trial court struck the expert witnesses and
granted the summary judgments.
The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision on three grounds.
First, the court found that since the experts could not rule out the possi-
bility that Helm would have developed his complications even if the de-
fendants had treated him timely, the experts' opinions were merely that
81. Id. at 496.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 495.
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Helm "was deprived his only chance" to avoid his complications.84 Since
Texas courts do not recognize the lost chance doctrine, the testimony was
not relevant or reliable. Second, the court held that the testimony that
prompt fluid resuscitation would have likely prevented the complications
was not supported by the medical literature. Finally, the court noted that
the plaintiffs' expert testimony was not admissible because the experts
were not able to exclude the possibility that even with prompt fluid resus-
citation, Thomas Helm would have suffered the same complications.
None of these holdings survive scrutiny under the law or common sense.
Since the trial court initially characterized the plaintiffs' experts' testi-
mony as merely supportive of a "lost chance" theory, it held that it was
not relevant. In Kramer v. Lewisville Memorial Hospital,85 the Texas Su-
preme Court held that the Wrongful Death Act and the Survival Statute
do not allow recovery for lost chance of survival or cure in a medical
malpractice action. 86 In doing so, the court recognized that "reasonable
medical probability" requires a plaintiff to show that it is "more likely
than not" that the ultimate harm or condition resulted from the defen-
dant's negligence. 87 The court stated that "the ultimate standard of proof
on the causation issue is whether, by a preponderance of the evidence the
negligent act or omission is shown to be a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm and without which the harm would not have occurred. '88
The Texas Supreme Court then concluded that "[tihe effect of these stan-
dards is to bar recovery where the defendant's negligence deprived the
tort victim of only a 50% or less chance of avoiding the ultimate harm."'89
This is merely the common sense application of traditional causation
principles.
Kramer was clearly not applicable in Helm. While both plaintiffs' ex-
perts made statements that the failure to timely treat Helm deprived him
of his "only chance" to avoid the complications and that some patients
will develop severe necrotizing pancreatitis no matter how quickly they
are diagnosed and treated, they both agreed that early hydration would
have altered Thomas's course with a "reasonable degree of medical
probability."90 Dr. Yiantsou also testified that if the pancreatitis had
been diagnosed within 1-2 hours after the ERCP, Thomas Helm would
have had a "sixty to seventy percent chance of responding." 91 The plain-
tiffs' other expert, Dr. Keroak, agreed, saying that if Thomas Helm would
have received "timely, aggressive fluid therapy in reasonable medical
probability he would have done much better."92
84. Helm, 61 S.W.3d at 497.
85. 858 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. 1993).
86. Id. at 398.
87. Id. at 400.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Helm, 61 S.W.3d at 497.
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 496.
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If all of the experts agreed that aggressive fluid therapy was the stan-
dard treatment in this case, and the plaintiffs' experts testified that, based
on their clinical experience, there was a greater than 50 percent chance
that Thomas Helm would have done much better had he been treated
according to the standard of care, that should have ended the Rule 702
analysis and allowed the Helm family their day in court.93 Instead, the
appellate court next misapplied the Robinson factors to hold that the
plaintiffs' experts' opinions were not supported by the medical literature.
While the court noted that "[t]he medical literature supports, and all of
the experts agree, that fluid resuscitation is a support measure that should
be given to patients with pancreatitis, '94 there were no studies indicating
"that an eight or thirteen hour delay in giving fluid therapy prevents or
lessens the complications of severe necrotizing pancreatitis. '' 95 The court
also noted that "since all patients are given the support measure when
pancreatitis is diagnosed," and "no medical professional would intention-
ally delay providing the fluid therapy" to "test the effect of the delay,"
there is no support for the proposition that a thirteen hour delay in giving
this treatment could increase the severity of the complications. 96
But a trial court's analysis is not so limited under Robinson and Gam-
93. It is well-established that a physician's testimony on causation can be based upon
his clinical experience. See, e.g., McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir.
1995) (noting that a doctor was qualified under Daubert to give expert opinion on cause of
throat ailment based on experience as medical doctor and certification in field of otolaryn-
gology); Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 263-266 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding
that a physician's testimony on cause of plaintiff's sinus problem, which was based on dif-
ferential diagnosis and temporal relationship between events, was admissible under
Daubert); Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 126 F.3d 679, 703 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting in the
context of a medical opinion based on clinical evidence that "simply because a non-scien-
tific expert's testimony touches on evidence that theoretically could be tested by
Newtonian science, Daubert should not be interpreted as to permit an advocate to put his
or her opponent to the burden of establishing hard scientific reliability-validity on de-
mand") (quoting 2 GRAHM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.5, at 79 (4th ed.
1996)); Carroll v. Morgan, 17 F.3d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that a doctor was
qualified under Daubert to give an expert opinion on standard of medical care based on
thirty years of experience as a practicing, board-certified cardiologist and his review of
medical records); Laski v. Bellwood, No. 96-2188, 1997 WL 764416, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 26,
1997) (holding that the district court erred under abuse of discretion standard by not ad-
mitting opinion testimony from treating physician on issue of causation); Cantrell v. GAF
Corp., 999 F.2d 1007, 1014 (6th Cir. 1993) ("Nothing ... prohibits an expert witness from
testifying to confirmatory data, gained through his own clinical experience, on the origin of
a disease or the consequences of exposure to certain conditions"); Hopkins v. Dow Corn-
ing Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1125 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the district court properly admit-
ted expert testimony under Daubert that was based on, among other things, the doctor's
clinical experience and review of the medical records); Becker v. Nat'l Health Prods., Inc.,
896 F. Supp. 100 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (admitting one expert's opinion based, in part, on over
30 years experience as a physician, and a second expert's opinion based, in part, on
"clinical experience with 10,000 patients, solely in gastroenterology"). While many of
these opinions interpret the pre-December 1, 2000 version Federal Rule of Evidence 702,
that rule is the same as Texas Rule of Evidence 702, and a court's gatekeeper functions
under Daubert and Robinson!Gammill are the same.
94. Helm, 61 S.W.3d at 497 (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
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mill.97 The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that ultimately,
the trial court must determine the best way to assess reliability, and the
method chosen is reviewed based on an abuse of discretion standard.
98
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals used this common sense approach in
the context of a medical expert in another case decided during the Survey
period, J.C. Penney Life Insurance Co. v. Baker.9 9 In Baker, J.C. Penny
argued that Baker's expert's "testimony should have been excluded be-
cause it could not meet any of the factors set forth in Robinson."10 0 After
discussing the expert's testimony and qualifications, the Forth Worth ap-
pellate court held that the expert's "opinions are clearly not the type of
testimony that can be easily evaluated under the Robinson factors."' 01
Applying Gammill's "analytical gap" analysis, the court then found that
the expert's opinions were reliable.' 0 2 This is the type of flexible analysis
intended under Robinson/Gammill. Courts must never forget that "[t]he
trial court's gatekeeping function under Rule 702 does not supplant cross-
examination as 'the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky
but admissible evidence." 0 3
In Helm, the plaintiffs' experts were testifying based on their own
clinical experience. Furthermore, there are obvious clinical and physio-
logical reasons why fluid therapy is applied in every case as soon as the
diagnosis of pancreatitis is made. But since there were no specific studies
showing that a thirteen hour delay in giving this standard treatment re-
sults in more severe complications, the San Antonio Court of Appeals
held that an expert opinion on that point is unreliable. Thus, if a person
within the Fourth Appellate District lays in a hospital bed in severe pain
for thirteen hours being denied the standard treatment for his condition
and this neglect results in crippling disabilities that the person likely
would not have suffered but for the negligence of the hospital and physi-
cian that the person trusted for his care, the person has no remedy. And
97. Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726 ("[I]t is equally clear that the considerations listed in
Daubert and in Robinson for assessing the reliability of scientific evidence cannot always
be used with other kinds of expert testimony.").
98. See id. at 727; Helena Chem. Co., v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex. 2001) (re-
minding Texas judges that when the Robinson factors do not apply, "there still must be
some basis for the opinion offered to show its reliability, and, ultimately, the trial court
must determine how to assess reliability").
99. 33 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet.).
100. Id. at 427.
101. Id. at 428.
102. Id.
103. Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 728 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596); see also Alice
Leasing Corp. v. Castillo, 53 S.W.3d 433, 446 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
In Castillo, the defendant attacked the plaintiff's expert's use of a videotaped demonstra-
tion claiming that "the demonstration was not substantially similar to the conditions of the
accident." Castillo, 53 S.W.3d at 446. Before the tape was shown to the jury, the defen-
dant's counsel asked to take the expert on voir dire to show that the device depicted in the
tape was not substantially similar to that used in the accident. The trial court refused, and
its decision was upheld on appeal. The San Antonio Court of Appeals, in an opinion writ-
ten by Justice Alma Lopez, who was not on the panel in Helm, noted that the defense
counsel's opportunity to vigorously cross-examination the expert was the proper method of
testing the evidence. Id.
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under the San Antonio Court of Appeals' reasoning, there will not be a
remedy for such injuries until some sadistic doctor intentionally delays
giving his patients the universally-accepted treatment for pancreatitis in
order to publish a study showing the effect of that delay.
The Helm court was not finished misinterpreting the law. It next held
that since the plaintiffs' experts were not able to "exclude the possibility"
that even with prompt fluid resuscitation, Thomas Helm would have suf-
fered the same complications, the experts' testimony that the complica-
tions were caused by the delay in fluid resuscitation was "mere
speculation.' 1 0 4 In support of this, the court cited Robinson10 5 and its
own opinion in Weiss v. Mechanical Associated Servs.10 6 This is also a
misinterpretation of the law. Robinson does not say that an expert must
rule out completely other potential causes. It merely says that the expert
must "carefully consider alternative causes" and rule them out within a
reasonable degree of probability, i.e. there is a more than a 50% chance
that it was the actions of the defendant that caused the injury in ques-
tion.1°7 The plaintiffs' experts in Helm obviously satisfied this require-
ment. The court's opinion and its analysis in this case are shameful.
The issue of medical testimony based on clinical experience also arose
in Pack v. Crossroads, Inc.10 8 discussed in section II above. The plaintiffs
sought to introduce the hospital admission records, which stated that the
doctors and nurses on duty at the time James Watson was admitted to
Harris Methodist Hospital suspected from the nature of the injuries that
they were the result of elder abuse and neglect. The plaintiffs wanted to
supplement the evidence contained in those records with the live testi-
mony of the doctor on duty at the time of the admission. The trial court,
however, required the references to abuse and neglect to be redacted
from the records and prohibited the doctor from testifying that he sus-
pected that the injuries resulted from abuse and neglect.' 0 9
The trial court based its decision to exclude this evidence on the fact
that the doctor and staff at the hospital did not know at the time of James
Watson's admission the length of time that he had lived at the nursing
home, the conditions from which he suffered before he entered the nurs-
ing home, or the physician's orders for James Watson while he stayed at
the nursing home. Because they did not have this information, the trial
court concluded, and the appellate court agreed, that any opinion that
James Watson suffered from abuse and neglect must be purely specula-
tive. Yet the fact that the hospital's doctors and staff did not have this
information would not have changed their diagnosis. They proposed to
testify that based on their medical training and clinical experience there
was a reasonable medical probability that James Watson's injuries were
104. Helm, 61 S.W.3d at 497-98.
105. Id. at 497 (citing Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 559).
106. 989 S.W.2d 120, 125-26 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
107. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 559.
108. 53 S.W.3d at 500-01.
109. Id. at 501.
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the result of neglect or abuse. Other testimony was available to establish
where and over what period of time that abuse occurred.
The fact that these doctors and nurses did not know that James Watson
had lived at the nursing home for thirty-seven days or his condition when
he entered the nursing home would have had no effect on those opinions
and should have been simply matters for cross-examination. In fact, the
evidence that James Watson had lived in the nursing home so long actu-
ally supported the medical opinion that his condition at the time he en-
tered the hospital resulted from the neglect he received while living there.
And the court did not state what his condition was before admittance to
the nursing home except that he suffered from "health problems" after
hip surgery. His actual condition at the time of admission to the nursing
home may have also supported the doctor's and nurses' opinion that Wat-
son was abused and neglected. The problem is that the court did not
discuss those issues. It simply ignored them and excluded the testimony
by concluding that it was speculative without any real analysis as to why.
The court should have analyzed this testimony under Robinson/Gam-
mill. What type of training and clinical experience did these medical pro-
fessionals have with these types of injuries? What were the other
potential causes of James Watson's injuries besides neglect? Did the doc-
tor and nurses consider other potential causes as required under Robin-
son? All expert opinion testimony is speculative to some degree. Courts
should not side-step their gatekeeping duties under Rule 702 by simply
calling opinion testimony speculative and excluding it without conducting
a proper analysis.I1 0
III. PRIVILEGES
A. PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Texas Rules of Evidence 509(c)(1) protects confidential communica-
tions between a patient and her physician." 1 The only case of note on
this subject during the Survey period is Rios v. Texas Department of
Mental Health and Mental Retardation."2 Tereso and Rose Rios were
struck in a car accident by a MHMR employee in July 1993. In April
1994, Dr. Garza-Vale examined Tereso Rios to give him a second opinion
concerning his back injury suffered in the accident and advised against
surgery at that time. The Rios couple filed their suit in September 1994.
The suit dragged on for several years, then, in 1998, the defendant's attor-
ney hired Dr. Garza-Vale as an expert for the defense. The plaintiffs ob-
110. The trial and appellate courts also demonstrated their complete lack of under-
standing of Rule 403 by further justifying exclusion of this evidence because it was "very
inflammatory," i.e. very probative. Pack, 53 S.W.3d at 501. Rule 403 is not a means by
which courts can exclude probative evidence simply because it makes it more likely that
doctors, insurance companies, and corporations will lose.
111. TEX. R. EVID. 509(c)(1) (stating: "Confidential communications between a physi-
cian and a patient, relative to or in connection with any professional services rendered by a
physician to the patient are privileged and may not be disclosed").
112. 58 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
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jected, arguing that this arrangement was improper both because it
violates the physician-patient privilege and because "it conflicts with a
physician's fiduciary duty of loyalty to his patient and invites improper
influence that threatens the relationship of trust [and] confidence.' '113
The court first addressed the privilege argument. The litigation excep-
tion to the physician-patient privilege states that communications or
records relating to a particular condition are no longer privileged when
the patient relies upon the condition as part of his claim or defense.11 4
Tereso Rios was suing to recover damages for the back injury he suffered
in the accident. Dr. Garza-Vale's testimony concerning that injury was,
therefore, not covered by the privilege.
The issue concerning the defense hiring a treating physician as an ex-
pert was more troubling. In a long footnote, the appellate court discusses
the potential problems with such an arrangement." 5 The plaintiffs relied
on Homer v. Rowan Companies from the Southern District of Texas to
support their argument that such arrangement should be deemed im-
proper.116 The Homer opinion only deals with the issue of ex-parte com-
munications with treating physicians. But the Homer court's concerns
with such communications are obviously greater when the party opposing
the patient is paying the treating physician to testify.
In Homer, the court was mainly concerned that ex-parte communica-
tions would spill over into areas that remain privileged:
When a treating physician is interviewed ex parte by defense counsel,
there are no safeguards against the revelation of matters irrelevant
to the lawsuit and personally damaging to the patient, and the poten-
tial for breaches in confidentiality can have a chilling effect upon the
critically important underlying relationship. Such interviews also
create situations which invite questionable conduct. They may dis-
integrate into a discussion of the adverse impact the jury award may
have on the rising cost of medical insurance rates. They may result
in attempts to dissuade the doctor from testifying. They may result
in defense counsel abusing the opportunity to interrogate the physi-
cian by privately inquiring into facts or opinions about the patient's
mental and physical health or history which might neither be rele-
vant to the law suit nor lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.' 17
Such discussions can clearly lead to violations of the Rule 509 privilege
because without the patient's counsel present, the physician and opposing
counsel are left to determine what information is subject to the privi-
113. Id. at 169.
114. TEX. R. EvID. 509(e)(4) (stating that an exception to the privilege exists "as to a
communication or record relevant to an issue of the physical, mental or emotional condi-
tion of a patient in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as part of
the party's claim or defense").
115. Id. at 171 n.1.
116. 153 F.R.D. 597 (S.D. Tex. 1994); see also Perkins v. United States, 877 F. Supp.
330, 333 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
117. Homer, 153 F.R.D. at 601 (citations omitted).
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lege-a determination that the doctor is not qualified to make." l8 The
Homer court stated that "[r]equiring the contact with treating physicians
to occur only in the context of formal discovery ... protects any informa-
tion still privileged by assuring plaintiff's representative will be in a posi-
tion to timely assert the privilege where appropriate."' 19 The court
concluded that formal discovery "is simply the fairest and most satisfac-
tory means of obtaining discovery from a treating physician."' 120
The arrangement in Rios goes beyond the court's concerns in Homer.
In Rios, the treating physician was an expert for the defense. While the
arrangement caused the appellate court some concern, the court con-
cluded that "[i]t is not the role of this intermediate court to craft a new
rule where none currently exists."121 But Rule 509 is based on a state
policy to encourage a relationship of trust and confidence between a doc-
tor and his or her patient. Allowing a doctor to be paid to serve as an
expert witness in an adversarial proceeding against a former patient vio-
lates that policy. The rule proposed by the court in Homer is a logical
extension of Rule 509 and would serve to promote the state's policies by
protecting the physician-patient relationship. It would also eliminate the
possibility of the awkward situation created in Rios. As the court in
Homer pointed out, a rule prohibiting ex-parte communications with
treating physicians would not affect the substance of what information
would be discoverable or what evidence would be admissible at trial, it
would only regulate how counsel "may obtain information from a treat-
ing physician."' 22
B. PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE
In determining if the peer review privilege exists, focus should be
placed on the actual existence of the committee as a functioning body for
the evaluation of medical services so as to limit any potential abuse of
using a committee to hide discoverable evidence. During the Survey pe-
riod, the Texas Supreme Court demonstrated the way courts should ana-
lyze questions of peer review privilege in In re University of Texas Health
Center.123
The committee at issue in In re University of Texas Health Center was
the hospital's Infection Control Committee. In order to determine
whether that committee fell within the statutory privilege, the court first
examined whether it fell within the statutory definition of a peer review
committee. 124 Section 151.002(a)(8) of the Texas Occupation Code de-
fines "Medical peer review committee" or "professional review body" as:
118. Id.
119. Id. at 601-02.
120. Id. at 602.
121. Rios, 58 S.W.3d at 170.
122. Homer, 153 F.R.D. at 602.
123. 33 S.W.3d 822 (Tex. 2000).
124. Id. at 824-25.
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a committee of a health care entity, the governing board of a health
care entity, or the medical staff of a health care entity, that operates
under written bylaws approved by the policy-making body or the
governing board of the health care entity and is authorized to evalu-
ate the quality of medical and health care services or the competence
of physicians.' 2 5
Thus, to receive the protections afforded by the statute, a committee
must be properly formed under the entity's by-laws and be vested with
the authority to review the quality of the health care services provided by
the facilities physicians and staff. UT Health Center demonstrated that
its by-laws provided for the establishment of the Infection Control Com-
mittee and authorized it to review the quality of its health care ser-
vices.' 26 Therefore, the Infection Control Committee fell within the
statutory definition of a medical peer review committee and would be
afforded privilege in the appropriate situations.
The court next examined whether the Infection Control Committee ac-
tually performed "peer review" functions as defined under the relevant
statute.127 Section 151.002(a)(7) of the Texas Occupation Code defines
"Medical peer review" or "professional review action" as
the evaluation of medical and health care services, including evalua-
tion of the qualifications of professional health care practitioners and
of patient care provided by those practitioners. The term includes
evaluation of the: (A) merits of a complaint relating to a health care
practitioner and a determination or recommendation regarding the
complaint; (B) accuracy of a diagnosis; (C) quality of the care pro-
vided by a health care practitioner; (D) report made to a medical
peer review committee concerning activities under the committee's
review authority; (E) report made by a medical peer review commit-
tee to another committee or to the board as permitted or required by
law; and (F) implementation of the duties of a medical peer review
committee by a member, agent, or employee of the committee. 28
It was undisputed in the trial court that all the documents at issue were
"created by or at the request" of the Health Center's Infection Control
Committee and solely in connection with the evaluation of the medical
care received by patients contracting infections.1 29 The court concluded
that the documents sought were properly protected by the peer review
privilege and were off limits barring a written waiver in accordance with
the statute.130
125. TEX. Occ. CODE § 151.002(a)(8) (Vernon 2000).
126. 33 S.W.3d at 825.
127. Id. at 825.
128. TEX. Occ. CODE § 151.002(a)(7) (Vernon 2000).
129. 33 S.W.3d at 825-26.
130. Id. at 826 (holding that voluntary disclosure through interrogatory answers of rec-
ommendations made within the committee's privileged documents did not constitute a
waiver of the peer review privilege; the information was disclosed but the documents re-




In applying this two-step process, trial courts must pay close attention
to the actual function of the committee receiving the reports and the
committee's actual use of the reports. Hospitals must not be able to hide
business records, incident reports, and other documents created in the
normal course of business that are not created exclusively for use by a
peer review committee in conducting peer review by using pre-printed
buzzwords on the documents or by merely sending a copy to a body au-
thorized to conduct peer review under the facility's by-laws. By following
this function/use analytical approach, courts can ensure that the peer re-
view privilege is not abused.
C. ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
In National Converting & Fulfillment Corp. v. Bankers Trust Corp.,31
Judge Buchmeyer framed the issue as follows: "The Court must decide
whether a person who is not an employee of a corporation, but who is the
close relative of the owner of such corporation and who is given substan-
tial authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, may be considered
the 'representative of the client' under Texas Rule of Evidence503(a)(2)."1132
Randall Riecke is the son of Melvin Riecke who owns two of the plain-
tiff corporations. Randall is a licensed attorney in Texas, but he works
primarily as a CPA, not an attorney, and he had advised his father's busi-
ness in that capacity. Occasionally, Melvin Riecke would discuss legal
issues with his son and then ask his son to discuss these issues with the
company lawyer, Bill Smith. Magistrate Judge Sanderson held that "to
the extent that Melvin Riecke used Randall as a representative to seek
legal advice from counsel, . . . such communications ... are protected by
Texas Rule of Evidence 503(a)(2)(A).' 1 33 The defendants objected to
Judge Sanderson's order, and the matter came before Judge Buchmeyer.
Judge Buchmeyer held that Randall's statements to the company law-
yer fell under 503(a)(2)(A), which defines "representative of the client"
as "(A) a person having authority to obtain professional legal services, or
to act on advice thereby rendered, on behalf of the client or (B) any per-
son who, for the purpose of effectuating legal representation of the client,
makes or receives a confidential communication while acting in the scope
of employment for the client.' 34 Rule 503(a)(2)(A) represents the "con-
trol group test," which extends the attorney-client privilege to "state-
131. 134 F. Supp. 2d 804 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
132. Id. at 805.
133. Id. at 807.
134. Id. at 805; see also TEX. R. EVID. 503(a)(2)(B). Rule 503(a)(2)(B) extends this
definition to also include "any person who, for the purpose of effectuating legal represen-
tation of the client, makes or receives a confidential communication while acting in the
scope of employment for the client." This is the "subject matter" test, which protects state-
ments by lower level employees acting within the scope of their employment. The Texas
Supreme Court added this sub-section in 1998 to align the privilege in Texas to that




ments made by employees in a position to control or even take a
substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may
take upon the advice of the attorney."'1 35 Judge Buchmeyer found that
the language of Rule 503(a)(2)(A) "does not require on its face that the
representative of the client be an employee .... ,,136 While noting that
National Tank could be read to require the representative to be an em-
ployee, the court was addressing a situation where employees had made
the allegedly privileged statements. 137 Thus, Buchmeyer concluded, the
opinion naturally discussed only what type of employee could fall under
the privilege and does not stand for the proposition that only communica-
tions by an actual employee can be protected. Judge Buchmeyer then
noted that Randall (1) had been granted authority to speak to the attor-
ney on the company's legal issues, (2) "had the ability to shape the course
of action that companies would take," and (3) was entrusted to relay the
attorney's advice back to Melvin.' 38 Thus, Judge Buchmeyer agreed with
Judge Sanderson and held that Randall's discussion with the attorney was
privileged.
There are some problems with Judge Buchmeyer's opinion, however.
The opinion never states the basis for the conclusion that Randall could
actually shape the course of the companies' response other than the fact
that Randall was Melvin's son and a CPA. Randall merely had authority
to relate the legal advice back to his father who was the person with the
actual authority. There is no general family communication privilege in
Texas, nor are communications to a CPA privileged. One must also con-
sider the language in National Tank that Buchmeyer noted could be con-
strued to extend the privilege only to employees. The Texas Supreme
Court stated in National Tank that the control group test "reflects the
distinction between the corporate entity and the individual employee and
is based on the premise that only an employee who controls the actions of
the corporation can personify the corporation. '139 Randall was not an
employee, and to the extent he could shape any action based upon legal
advice, it was simply as his father's advisor. It was the father who con-
trolled the actions of the corporation. In reality, Judge Buchmeyer recog-
nized a new privilege in Texas-the "my-son-the-CPA" privilege.
Compare Judge Buchmeyer's analysis to that of Judge Rakoff of the
Southern District of New York in Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wach-
ner,140 which was also decided during the Survey period. In rejecting
David Boies's argument that his discussions with a public relations firm
relating to the way in which Calvin Klein wanted to spin the case in the
media were privileged, Judge Rakoff noted that "it must not be forgotten
that the attorney-client privilege, like all evidentiary privileges, stands in
135. Nat'l Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Tex. 1993) (citations omitted).
136. Nat'l Converting, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 806.
137. Id. (emphasis in orig.)
138. Id.
139. Nat'l Tank, 851 S.W.2d at 197.
140. 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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derogation of the search for truth so essential to the effective operation
of any system of justice."' 4' Thus, the privilege "must be narrowly con-
strued."'1 42 Even if the PR firm's advice aided the attorney in formulating
his legal advice to the client, "the privilege protects communications be-
tween a client and an attorney, not communications that prove important
to an attorney's legal advice to a client.' 143
In In re Cooper,144 the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that an assign-
ment of a defendant's Stowers claim against its insurer does not automati-
cally waive the defendant's attorney-client privilege. 145 Harold Joseph
obtained a judgment at trial against David Cooper in a case that arose
from a car wreck. The judgment was in excess of Cooper's insurance cov-
erage, and Cooper assigned his claims against his insurer to Joseph. Jo-
seph then sued the insurance company for negligent failure to settle the
claim and requested that Cooper's attorneys turn over their files from
that previous lawsuit. The trial court found that Cooper had waived his
attorney/client privilege when he assigned his claims and ordered
Cooper's attorneys to produce their files. Cooper filed a writ of manda-
mus seeking protection from the discovery order.
The trial court concluded that the assignment necessarily included a
waiver because it was "part and parcel of the deal" and without it there
would not be an effective assignment. 46 Texas Rule of Evidence 511(1)
provides that the privilege is waived if the client holding the privilege
consents to disclosure, but the Beaumont Court of Appeals reasoned that
the consent must be explicit. It cannot be implied from the assign-
ment.' 47 While noting that such an assignment "could and, perhaps,
should include such a waiver,"' 48 this one did not. Therefore, Cooper did
not waive his attorney-client privilege, and the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in ordering his attorneys to produce their files. The court's rea-
soning is sound. In the future, attorneys should include an express waiver
of the assignor's attorney-client privilege in any assignment of a Stowers
claim.
IV. OTHER INTERESTING CASES
A. HEARSAY
In Freeman v. American Motorists Insurance Co.,149 the plaintiff argued
that the statute of limitations was tolled because he was legally disabled
under section 16.001(a)(2) of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code, which
141. Id. at 55.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 54.
144. 47 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, orig. proceeding).
145. Id. at 209.
146. Id. at 208.
147. Id.
148. Id. n.2.
149. 53 S.W.3d 710 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
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states that a person is legally disabled if they are of "unsound mind." 150
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that there
was no evidence of a legal disability. In response to the motion for sum-
mary judgment, the plaintiff submitted a letter from his physician written
ten years after the accident and ten days before the summary judgment
hearing. The letter stated that plaintiff "did not have the appropriate
judgment and the mental capacity to comprehend his circumstances and
therefore did not pursue litigation."' 51
The defendant objected to the letter as hearsay. The plaintiff re-
sponded that it fell under the business records exception found in Rule
803(6), which states that a report of a diagnosis made at or near the time
of record by a person with knowledge is not excluded under the rule if it
was the regular practice of that business to make the report.152
In rejecting the plaintiff's argument, the court noted that to fall under
this exception, a doctor's note must "qualify as a routine entry in the
[patient's] medical history. 1 53 The court then stated that the time that
the letter was written-ten years after the accident and ten days before
the summary judgment motion-indicafed a lack of trustworthiness. In-
stead of a routine entry in the medical record, the letter appeared to be
written "solely in response to a request from Freeman's attorney. 1' 54
The court stated that the letter "'on its face,' is 'an attempt to convey an
opinion which has been elicited by an outside interested source."1 55 In
that case, the letter is not admissible under Rule 803(6).
B. SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
The Tyler Court of Appeals in Lively v. Blackwell156 reaffirmed that
the issue of spoliation of evidence is a fact issue for the jury-not the
court. However, the court then applied an outcome-oriented analysis to
deny the plaintiff a fair trial on the issue.
In Lively, the plaintiff underwent a diagnostic laproscopy procedure to
evaluate an ovarian cyst. After the procedure, the patient developed se-
vere complications as a result of internal bleeding. In the subsequent
lawsuit, the issue was whether the physician was negligent in closing the
surgical wound when he knew or should have known that the patient was
still bleeding internally.
During the procedure, a video camera projected images from the pro-
cedure onto a monitor in the operating room. The defendant doctor testi-
fied that from his view on the monitor, there was no bleeding. But the
nurse anesthetist who attended the surgery testified that the monitor
150. Id. (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.001(a)(2) (Vernon Supp.
2001)).
151. Id. at 714 (quoting the letter from plaintiff's doctor).
152. Id. (citing TEX. R. EVID. 803(6)).
153. Id.
154. Freeman, 53 S.W.3d at 715.
155. Id. (quoting Sauceda, 636 S.W.2d at 499).
156. 51 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001, pet. denied).
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showed "misting of blood" just before the incision was closed. 157 The
defendant doctor admitted that if there had been significant bleeding and
he failed to stop it before he closed the incision, he would have been
negligent. The procedure was also supposed to have been videotaped. It
was clear that a videotape of the procedure would have shown if that
bleeding was, in fact, present. When the plaintiff received a copy of the
videotape through discovery, however, it was blank.
In response to receiving this blank tape, plaintiffs sought to introduce
at trial evidence that the doctor had erased the tape, and thus spoliated
the evidence. At a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the plaintiff
showed that the hospital charged her for a tape, a video camera, a VCR,
and a drape to cover the monitor. She also introduced expert testimony
showing that the tape would be part of the hospital's records and if a
doctor removed it, he or she would be responsible for it.
The doctor testified in response that he kept the tape at his office and
turned it over to his lawyer without viewing it. He also introduced testi-
mony of a hospital employee designated as the person knowledgeable of
videotape procedures who testified that of the forty procedures that were
videotaped the year of the plaintiff's procedure, two, including the one at
issue, ended up blank. The defendant argued that this could have been
caused by the equipment not being connected properly.
After the hearing, the defendant argued, incorrectly, that whether spo-
liation of evidence had occurred was a question of law for the court to
decide, and since the plaintiff had "failed to make a 'prima facie' showing
that the procedure was actually recorded and that [the defendant] had
intentionally or negligently destroyed evidence," the plaintiff should be
prevented from introducing any evidence of the circumstances surround-
ing the tape. 158 The trial court agreed with the defendant's argument de-
spite the strong circumstantial evidence that the doctor erased the tape.
On appeal, the Tyler Court of Appeals first noted that the defendant's
assertion that spoliation is a question of law for the court was incor-
rect.159 Whether spoliation of evidence has occurred is a question of fact
for the jury.' 60 Since that was the defendant's only objection, the appel-
late court assumed the trial court's basis for excluding the evidence was
also incorrect. However, the trial court's decision will be upheld if there
was any proper ground for the ruling, 16 and in a decision that could only
be described as outcome-oriented, the Tyler Court of Appeals found one.
The appellate court determined that the evidence of spoliation could
be excluded on Rule 403 grounds.162 The analysis used to reach that con-
clusion would have earned an F on any law school Evidence exam. The
157. Id. at 638.
158. Id. at 640.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 640-41; see Malone v. Foster, 977 S.W.2d 562, 563 (Tex. 1998).
161. Lively, 51 S.W.3d at 641; see State Bar of Texas v. Evans, 774 S.W.2d 656, 658 n.5
(Tex. 1989).
162. Lively, 51 S.W.3d at 642.
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appellate court noted that the plaintiff has proven "(1) an attempt was
made to record the procedure, (2) [the defendant] maintained the tape at
his office, and (3) the tape was blank when it was produced in discov-
ery."1 63 This, along with the testimony that of the forty procedures taped
that year, only this tape and one other turned out blank, was strong cir-
cumstantial evidence that the doctor erased the tape. Strangely, the ap-
pellate court then noted in the same sentence that the plaintiff "did not
prove the procedure was actually recorded onto the videotape or that
[the defendant] destroyed the videotape if the procedure was re-
corded." 164 Had the court not just held that that was the ultimate ques-
tion for the jury?
While the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence was compelling, the court
favored the hospital employee's testimony that it was possible that the
video equipment was hooked up incorrectly. 165 The court then mused
that to accept the plaintiff's argument, one would have to "assume" that
the procedure was actually recorded. 16 6 The patient paid to have the pro-
cedure recorded, the equipment was set up in the operating room, and
the procedure was displayed on the monitor. Yet the defendant wanted
the court to assume that the equipment was hooked up incorrectly.
In its conclusion, the appellate court stated that since the plaintiff's evi-
dence of spoliation was based on merely "speculation and conjecture and
a reasonable explanation for the missing evidence exists," an accusation
of spoliation of evidence "can unfairly taint the juror's perception of the
alleged spoliator as one who is dishonest and deceitful."'1 67 Therefore, it
would have been proper to exclude the evidence on Rule 403 grounds.
As every student of Evidence learns in law school, all evidence is preju-
dicial. If it were not, the offering party would have no reason to present
it. Rule 403 allows a trial court to exclude otherwise admissible evidence
if its "probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.' 68 In the face of the strong circumstantial evidence of spolia-
tion in Lively, Rule 403 could not possible justify the exclusion of the
plaintiff's evidence. The appellate court noted that the videotape had the
"potential . . . to resolve a pivotal issue"-whether the plaintiff was
bleeding when the incision was closed. 169 This evidence thus had an ex-
tremely high probative value. This was not a Rule 403 analysis. This was
the Tyler Court of Appeals deciding to believe the doctor's lame excuse
that it was "possible" that the video equipment was not hooked up cor-





167. Lively, 51 S.W.3d at 642.
168. TEX. R. EvID. 403 (emphasis added). "Unfair prejudice" is usually defined as evi-
dence that would tempt the jury to make its decision on emotional or irrational grounds.
McDonald, 829 S.W.2d at 380.
169. Lively, 51 S.W.3d at 642.
2002]
SMU LAW REVIEW
the spoliation claim through a back door the court found in its twisted
application of the rules of evidence. The plaintiffs had enough evidence
for their spoliation accusation to make it to the jury. And the doctor
could have presented his excuse to them. The jury, not the court, has the
job of determining whether the spoliation actually occurred.
CONCLUSION
The cases from the Survey period teach several things. First, attorneys
must know the difference between expert testimony based on science and
that based on experience or specialized knowledge. They must know the
predicate for getting both admitted and present the court with a well-
organized argument detailing the expert's knowledge and experience and
how it relates to the facts of the case, thus filling the analytical gap. In
turn, judges must remember to be flexible in their analysis of expert testi-
mony and must trust juries to sort out the good from the bad as our
founding fathers intended.
Second, while privileges obstruct the pursuit of the truth and must
therefore be narrowly construed, courts should not ignore the important
policies behind them when analyzing whether they apply in particular sit-
uations. Peer review is an important function that hospitals and doctors
must perform to ensure the safety of patients. They should be able to
conduct this peer review without the threat of increased exposure to lia-
bility. However, the peer review privilege must be narrowly construed to
include only documents created specifically for qualified peer review
committees and actually used in the peer review process. The privilege
must not be a means to hide business records or other documents created
outside this process. The physician-patient privilege also serves to pro-
mote an important state policy. Allowing doctors that serve as paid wit-
nesses in cases against their own patients clearly violates that policy, and
Texas courts should fashion a rule to prohibit the practice. Lastly, the
attorney-client privilege is essential to effective representation. However,
when courts expand the privilege beyond communications between an at-
torney and her actual client, they cheapen the very privilege they seek to
protect.
Finally, several of the cases from this Survey period teach us that some
Texas judges appear willing to sacrifice common sense to please their po-
litical constituents-a continuing by-product of partisan judicial elections.
Therefore, Texas attorneys who represent the injured and helpless must
be ever-vigilant in protecting their clients' rights.
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